The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 65 | Number 4

Article 2

November 1998

Medicine as a Moral Art: The Hippocratic
Philosophy of Herbert Ratner, M.D.
Patrick G.D. Riley

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
Riley, Patrick G.D. (1998) "Medicine as a Moral Art: The Hippocratic Philosophy of Herbert Ratner, M.D.," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol.
65: No. 4, Article 2.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol65/iss4/2

Medicine as a Moral Art:
The Hippocratic Philosophy
of Herbert Ratner, M.D.
by
Patrick G. D. Riley, Ph.D.

The author holds a doctorate in philosophy from the Pontifical
University in Rome. A journalist by trade, he has reported and
broadcast from two dozen countries of Africa, Asia, Europe, and
North America. He presently teaches philosophy at Milwaukee Area
Technical College and classical civilization at Concordia University
of Wisconsin.

)

It may smack of quackery to claim that the medical profession can
protect itself against attacks from within and without simply by
returning to Hippocrates, Father of Western medicine, yet that is the
thesis of this little study. I propose to support it by examining the
philosophy and life's work of Herbert Ratner, a physician who until
his death at 90, on December 6, 1997, devoted well over half a
century to practicing and promoting Hippocratic medicine.
The claim that Hippocrates can defend the profession from all
attacks will seem all the more extreme when one considers their
gravity. They fall under three broad and somewhat overlapping
headings.
Probably the most pressing concern among physicians today is
subservience to big business, with threats from government not far
behind. Many see not just their income in jeopardy-that may be the
least of their concerns-but above all their freedom to follow their
professional judgment. If the doctor is not at liberty to prescribe the
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treatment he thinks best, then he, his knowledge, and his skills are no
longer at the service of his patient but in servitude to third parties,
namely businessmen.
Yet for decades an even deeper anxiety has been abroad. In
starkest terms, it is whether the physician is to be a killer as well as a
healer. Nothing, obviously, could more directly affect the moral
character, the ethos, of medicine. Nor since Nazi days has the
pressure on physicians to kill been stronger.
A third concern is the technological imperative, to adopt the
fashionable term. This is a hardy perennial, springing up every time
medicine makes what is perceived as an important advance. At such
a moment physicians, perhaps under pressure from patients, may be
tempted to resort to the new therapy without a thorough examination
of alternatives, including watchful waiting, or for that matter of the
new treatment itself.
In cases like that the ethical questions revolve around
prudence and proper method. However some techniques themselves
raise intrinsic ethical questions and, like complicity in suicide or
outright killing, menace the very nature of the medical profession. In
the 1960s contraceptive medicaments and devices were the focus of
such concerns, which in subsequent decades shifted-ironically but
perhaps inevitably-to new techniques for overcoming sterility, and
for procreation itself. Medicine seems to have had its Promethean
side since Renaissance days at least, but some of these techniques for
human reproduction might more aptly be termed Frankensteinian.
Grave ethical questions arise even from encroachments on the
medical profession by Wall Street and Washington, such as the failed
effort by the Clinton Administration to reorganize medical care under
governmental supervision. More recently, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services moved to regulate the distribution of donated organs
for transplant, giving the most seriously ill patients priority. I This was
immediately decried ' as a usurpation of the judgment of physicians,
and counterproductive. One result of the rule, it was claimed, would
be a long-term decline in the survival of liver patients, predictable
because transplants given those in advanced decline are less likely to
succeed. Also, transplants under the Federal government's new
system would be more expensive. 2
Physicians in various parts of the country have banded
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together fonnally or infonnally to offer less fettered if costlier care
than pre-paid plans such as health maintenance organizations and
preferred provider organizations. 3 In Eastern Massachusetts, long
known for its medical schools and teaching hospitals, physicians are
so alarmed that according to the New York Times some 2,000 of them
have called for a moratorium "on corporate takeovers of health
services and for curbs on the companies' intrusion into doctor's
decision-making. ,,4
The same report estimated that "a few thousand" physicians,
mostly in California and Florida, "have joined unions to challenge the
organizations." In February, 1998 the California Medical Association
made preparations to vote on creating a union subsidiary for
government-employed physicians and residents in training; this,
according to the New York Times, would make the California Medical
Association "the first professional group in the nation to step into the
gulf that has traditionally separated organized medicine from
physicians unions.,,5
One reason why physicians began to organize against
constraints and pressures from managed-care companies is that states
have held the physician, not the company, accountable for the care of
patients. But for several years the political climate has boded to
change this. In September, 1997, Texas became the first state to
recognize the right of a patient to sue a health maintenance
organization for medical malpractice, although patients around the
country have taken HMOs to court on the ground of broken contract. 6
By early 1998, popular indignation against the companies had
made them a whipping boy for politicians. In March, a California
woman without political experience who ran in a special election to
fill her late husband's congressional seat credited her win over an
anti-abortion opponent to her concern for health care. 7
Such a victory hardly indicated that the electorate had grown
weary of moral issues. They abound in managed care, though they
may not be so manifest as the drive to substitute the petri dish for the
marital bed, still less to tum the physician into a killer. The Moscati
Institute, a group organized in Duluth, Minnesota, to help guide
health professionals who are "uncertain about what is negotiable and
what is not," has written in a mission statement:
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Most managed care systems are so structured that patients' illnesses
become a liability to their doctors. Physicians are provided with
incentives, and typically are rewarded with end-of-year bonuses,
predicated on how much money they have saved the insurance
companies and health care conglomerates. Therefore, tests and
referrals to specialists-constitutive of traditional medical practice
-are closely monitored and meagerly assigned
In such controlled systems, medical staff and others
routinely insist that patients or their families sign "do not
resuscitate" (DNR) and "do not intubate" (DNI) orders. They argue
that these are necessary to protect patients from "intrusive
practices." But once signed, such orders become a mandate not to
treat even treatable illnesses, particularly in geriatric and neo-natal
care.
In short, managed care is rationed care, and is unavoidably
linked to euthanasia. 8

Lawmakers are keenly aware of these and other problems
seemingly indigenous to managed care. The New York Times reported
on May 22, 1997, that the Connecticut legislature had passed
legislation outlawing the "gag orders" by which health care
companies forbid physicians to inform patients of the various
treatments available. Such restrictions recall the ancient divergence,
mentioned by Plato, between the medical treatment of slaves, who
were scarcely consulted about their treatment, and the medical
treatment of free citizens.
Problems peculiar to managed care may seem beyond the
capacities of the more generalized agencies that oversee that industry.
In California, where three-quarters of those with health insurance
participate in a health maintenance organization, a special advisory
commission appointed by the governor has recommended that the
industry be removed from the purview of the state securities
regulatory body that has been overseeing it for the past two decades.
All regulation of health care, according to the commission, should be
consolidated under a single authority with power to adjudicate
complaints from patients. 9
Patients' rights moved to the forefront in legislatures across
the country, including the Congress, with the American Medical
Association and even insurance groups lobbying vigorously for such

8

Linacre Quarterly

1•
,

I

r

legislation. President Clinton urged fast action, and himself took
administrative steps to protect beneficiaries of Medicare and to
exclude from the insurance market for Federal employers insurers
who deny health coverage to the ill.]O However the specter of a vast
and suffocating new bureaucracy, banished with the defeat of
Clinton' s far-reaching health care plan in his first term, arose again.
The President's vow to rebuild his health care project piece by piece
was recalled, ruefully.
Yet dangers to medicine could be described not only in what
was reported, but in the way it was reported, such as repeated
references to patients as "customers" or "consumers." ]] An internal
memo of the Republican National Committee spoke of protecting
"consumers" from unfair treatment by HMOs.]2 Such language
betrays a tendency to regard medicine as a commercial enterprise
rather than a profession, and hence to make it all the more vulnerable
to the inroads of business and government.
Insouciant language can also symptomize one of the other
perils facing medicine. The New York Times, just a day after reporting
that Connecticut would curtail the power of managed-care companies
to deny treatment to their "customers" (the newspaper' s term),
unwittingly revealed a deeper debasement of the physician' s role than
manipulation by businessmen or harassment by bureaucrats. A frontpage report coruscated with indignation at a physician who had
patented the correlation between the level of a certain hormone and
the presence of a Down Syndrome fetus. For the medical experts
quoted, as apparently for the reporter, the outrage was that "many
pregnant women would go without being screened for the defect."
Nowhere in the account- and this has become the rule-was
any concern shown for the principle that had been the bedrock of the
medical profession since Hippocrates, namely respect for human life.
The hormonal test that physicians may find prohibitively expensive
because another physician is making profits is part of a search-anddestroy operation against severely abnormal infants in the womb.
Respect for human life, and with it the Hippocratic ethos,
seemed to be fading on other fronts. The voters of Oregon in
November, 1997 affirmed support for the state' s doctor-assisted
suicide law. Although the administrator of the Federal Drug
Enforcement Agency, Thomas Constantine, immediately warned that
November, 1998
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doctors in Oregon could lose the right to prescribe drugs if they
assisted in suicide, Attorney General Janet Reno countermanded him
the following June.
From early in his career, Herbert Ratner stood in the forefront
of opposition to such utilitarian medicine, as to a state-regulated,
commercialized, medicine and-not least-to a merely technological
medicine. A physician since 1935, he was founder and editor of the
influential quarterly Child & Family, and a major contributor to the
Encyclopedia Britannica' s guide to the "Great Books," the
Syntopicon.
As director of public health for the Chicago suburb of Oak
Park, he attracted national attention when he refused to dispense free
Salk polio vaccine without explaining its risks to parents. The village
board threatened him with dismissal-an example of politicians
exercising medical judgment. He was promptly vindicated when on
May 8, 1955, the U.S. Health Service suspended distribution of the
vaccine for reasons of safety.
Dr. Ratner' s critique of the methodology of the supposedly
inactivated Salk vaccine, which from 1955 to 1963 contained Simian
Virus 40, drew international attention when published in the
November, 1955 Bulletin of the American Association of Public
Health Physicians, of which he was then editor. It was corroborated
independently by a study of the West German Health Ministry.
As associate clinical professor of family and community
medicine at Loyola University Stritch School of Medicine, Chicago,
he helped in the foundation of the La Leche League for the promotion
of breast-feeding. He remained a consultant of the League until his
death. Nor did Dr. Ratner' s work for the family go unnoticed in
Rome; in 1982 the Holy See named him a consultor to its Council for
the Family.
For Ratner, the strongest protection the medical profession
can marshal against the technological temptation and against threats
from business, government, and utilitarianism is the Hippocratic
Oath, and the Hippocratic philosophy of medicine summed up in the
Oath but also found in the writings of the Hippocratic school.
Perhaps it should be said at the outset that Dr. Ratner's
hostility to utilitarianism- "the greatest good for the greatest
number" at the expense of individual persons--can scarcely be traced
10
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to his Jewishness and the role that utilitarian-oriented physicians took
in Nazi campaigns against Jews. He was a champion of Hippocratic
medicine long before the postwar Nuremberg trials, which revealed
how deeply physicians were implicated in Nazi campaigns to kill the
unfit, and to subject members of groups deemed inferior to painful
and lethal experiments. He found the bases for his Hippocratic
philosophy of medicine as a medical student in the '30s, while
reading Hippocrates and the great philosopher of nature, Aristotle.
They led him to the study of St. Thomas Aquinas, and eventually into
the Catholic Church.
The day the New York Times lamented commercial
restrictions on an abortion-oriented technique, I went to Chicago to
celebrate, with an overflow crowd, Dr. Ratner's 90th birthday. I have
counted myself a disciple for half a century, from the moment I heard
him speak at Catholic University in January 1949, and I probably
should make my debt to him clear. His account of the nature of
nature, so to speak, and his emphasis on nature as the norm of
normality (again so to speak), made an indelible impression. In the
intervening decades we became friends, and I continued to learn from
him. Like the gift of his friendship, this gift of wisdom is priceless,
and the present essay, designed to hand on the wisdom of Herbert
Ratner to others, is an act of piety in the classic sense of an attempt to
repay what can never be repaid.
Herbert Ratner's most priceless legacy to a medical profession
beset by threats from within and without is a profound explanation of
Hippocratic medicine and its implications, pithily and persuasively
expressed. No physician armed with this philosophy-a philosophy
articulated by Hippocrates and his school, and since supported by
thousands of years of productive tradition, a philosophy responsible
in large part for the reverence so long and so willingly paid the
profession-no physician so armed need search for rebuttals to the
' philosophically dated and historically discredited utilitarianism that
presents itself, now under this guise and now under that, as
modernization.
The Hippocratic physician will repudiate with scorn any
suggestion that killing is a part of his profession. While even those
laymen who know that Dr. Jack Kevorkian is an aberration may have
difficulty articulating why, the Hippocratic physician can unmask
November, 1998
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Kevorkian as no less a traitor to his profession and those under his
care than the physicians who sold out to the Nazis: he need only
explain what has preserved medicine as a profession for thousands of
years, namely its unshakable ethic, summed up in the Hippocratic
Oath.
The Oath has not merely summarized this ethic: the Oath has
committed the profession to it, and made it its very soul. Moreoverand this is integral to Dr. Ratner's philosophy-medicine became a
profession precisely because of the Oath, for in professing it one
became a doctor, that is a teacher (as the Oath required of him), and a
healer (as the Oath made him swear to be, and none other).
Doctors who abandoned their sworn Oath at the behest of the
Nazi regime were subject to the death penalty at the international
tribunal in Nuremberg. Had they remained faithful to their sworn
word, not only their patients and their profession but their own person
would have been protected. The principle holds today: a medical
profession permeated with the ethic of Hippocratic medicine will
stand as a rock against the ethically dubious encroachments, indeed
against the most brutal bullying, of big finance and big government
alike.
As for the technological temptation, how Hippocratic
medicine helps doctors resist that takes some explaining.
The governing principle here as throughout Herbert Ratner's
philosophy, which is the philosophy of Hippocrates and Aristotle, is
nature. Both the morality and the effectiveness of medicine-not
excluding the effectiveness of medical technology -hang upon its
respect for nature. Ratner sees nature as the healer as well as the
norm. No less significantly, he sees nature as the vicar of God' s
retribution.

Plants automatically lead good plant lives [Ratner
observes]. They do not have the freedom to do otherwise. They are
activated by tropisms which determinatively direct them to the good
plant life.... It is through these means that plants, though
unknowledgeable of the ends, fructiJY and flourish and attain their
ends.
Animals other than man also automatically lead good
animal lives. They, too, do not have the freedom to do otherwise.
They are activated through hierarchized instincts, which reflect the
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urge of all living things 'to partake in the eternal and divine' in the
only way possible to them, by self-propagation. 13

There Dr. Ratner is quoting Aristotle. 14 It was Aristotle's
perception of the role of purpose in nature, its inner drive toward a
goal, that guided not only philosophy but theology and physical
science until the seventeenth century, when the spectacular successes
of empirical science, which depends on description for its method and
on prediction for its justification, dealt the concept of intrinsic natural
purpose a blow from which it is still reeling.
That tended to return philosophy and all depending on it to
their primitive state in the mists of prehistory. Aristotle, giving us a
brief account of philosophy before his time, recalls the pioneer
thinkers who tried to explain the world in terms of matter and of
mathematics, and thus were precursors of the scientism of the
nineteenth century, still palely loitering. "Hence when a man spoke of
mind in nature," Aristotle recalled, probably referring to Anaxagoras,
"he seemed like a sane man speaking among lunatics.,,15
In Ratner's scheme of things, learning always falls short of the
wisdom of nature. Reliance on what empirical science has taught us
leads to disaster when our philosophical understanding of nature has
not kept pace with our empirical knowledge of nature, and does not
undergird it.
Ratner lays the groundwork for this concept in a passage
bristling with characteristic paradox:

Man's free choice is not left to itself. Though he is not
compelled by tropisms or instincts, man is not left adrift in
directing his natural destiny. He has the natural inclinations of a
mammalian and social animal.
There are inclinations which in Pascal would correspond
to his "simple pure ignorance." These natural inclinations can be
confounded by higher education, which gives the illusion of a
high order of intellectual and educational development but which,
in reality, falls far short of Pascal's " learned ignorance." ...As we
have nouveaux riches, so we have nouveaux intellectuals. Such
people have been educated out of their "simple pure ignorance"
but unfortunately have not been educated into a " learned
ignorance." 16
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Pascal's "learned ignorance," in Ratner's scheme, is a hardwon understanding that our natural inclinations have wise purposes
demanding respect even if not yet fully plumbed. Such an
understanding is only confinned when the technical or social sciences
uncover new functions of what man does by mere inclination. In fact,
that is one of the most important roles for those sciences.
The "higher education" deplored by Ratner tends less toward
respecting nature than manipulating it. It burdens its students with the
stultifying task of mastering nature without first obeying its laws. It is
the education that has been offered at most American universities
since roughly the turn of the century when they adopted the Gennan
model with its emphasis on the physical and social sciences, and on
research. The Gennan university and its American counterpart take
their character from the rationalist current of the Enlightenment,
hence ignore the kinds of knowledge stemming from affinity (such as
the "connatural knowledge" of Thomas Aquinas) or from instinct or
emotion (such as the "empathy" of Edith Stein and other
phenomenologists).17 More traditional education, based largely on
the Aristotelian tradition, respects instinct and emotion, and holds
that they have much to teach us.
Efforts to restore the broader and deeper education
traditionally called "liberal," which predominated in this country until
late in the last century, have in isolated instances been brilliantly
successful, but Ratner held that on the widespread re-establishment of
such education hangs the restoration of medicine, of the ethos,
independence, and esteem once characteristic of the profession.
Even tpevery effectiveness of medicine, paradoxical as it may
seem in this day of dazzling technology, also depends on the
restoration of liberal education and the philosophy it fosters. The
principal reason that such sound philosophy is vital to the
effectiveness of medicine is that it grasps the role of teleology-that
is, intrinsic purpose-in nature, thereby acknowledging the body
itself as the prime healer. Hence technology, whose limitations are
revealed with its every advance, that is every time it leaves its
previous achievements behind, takes second place.
In conversations on the respective roles of nature and
technology, Dr. Ratner illustrated how the Hippocratic philosophy
resists the technological imperative.
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Disease can overwhelm nature. A basic principle of the
art of medicine is to do for nature what nature would do for itself
if it could. But a tendency of physicians is to intervene before
intervention is necessary ..

Here he cited obstetrics, which he said "tends to be largely
interventionist, because man is impatient, and nature seems to be too
slow." He cautioned:
But interventionist medicine can end up substituting for
nature, as for example in Caesarians. If you know how to do a
Caesarian, and do it well, you enjoy doing it, so there's an
advantage to home delivery. An episiotomy is rarely necessary,
but you're tempted to say " Why wait?" You must give nature a
chance.

If you put interventionism to one side, he added, you end up
with natural childbirth.
A need for tonsillectomy is rare. The operation becomes
commonplace when you take out tonsils for prolonged sore throat.
It took a long time to realize that the tonsils are an important part
of the lymphatic system, protecting against disease such as bulbar
polio. Often we fail to understand the function of a part of the
body until we lose that part, as for example when we found that
the loss of the thyroid led to myxedema.

In that, said Ratner, the body is like a great work of art:
Mozart is a good example. It's difficult to know what
makes art great because all the parts work together. Imperfect art
gives you insights into great art.

Here he cited Beethoven and Brahms as offering insights, by
the imperfections of their art, into the perfect art of Mozart. (One
need not concur with the examples to grasp the principle.)
Still on the theme of the body as its own healer, he asked why
a patient goes to a doctor. His answer: "A distressing symptom."

I

The prevailing philosophy is that a doctor has a
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medication for every symptom. If it's fever, we start with the
notion of fighting it, and forget that fever is a curative factor of
nature. We don't think of symptoms as curative, but we should
bear in mind that they are.

When the patient leaves the doctor's office with only the
advice to wait patiently and get back to him if the symptoms don't
disappear, he may think the doctor has done nothing for him. On the
other hand:
If he leaves with a piece of paper, he 's more likely to
feel satisfied. Writing a prescription is the fastest way of getting a
patient out of your office. The hardest thing in medicine is to do
nothing.

Isn't there a very important role for medicines, and for
surgery?

I

1

No question. To help nature you need techniques. You
must be competent. This is the premise.
As a non-surgeon, you must know what surgery might be
indicated. I need a surgeon who'll go my way in terms of my
clinical judgment.

(This is in accord with the Hippocratic notion of surgery as a
secondary art, dependent on the physician.)
But "this day of synthetic drugs," he said, brings its own
problems.
The body isn ' t constituted to handle them, to detoxity
itself ofthem. They baffle the liver. IS

He recalled that one of his first practical lessons as a young
physician was to remove all medications from a patient who was
taking five or six different kinds of pill. He found, for example, that
some prescriptions were written to counter the unwanted effects of an
earlier prescription, as when an insomniac patient on a sedative is
given a stimulant to counteract the resulting dopeyness.
But some prescriptions do damage by their very nature.
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The best example is drugs messing up a woman' s
honnonal system. When the Pill came out, I told Chris Knott [the
late Msgr. John C. KnOll, director of the Family Life Office of the
United States Catholic Conference] that the trouble with it was
giving a powerful drug to healthy women.

This, he pointed out, is diametrically opposed to the
Hippocratic philosophy of medicine. (He observed parenthetically
that widespread use of the birth control pill has meant higher
concentrations of female hormones in the water supply.)
To ignore the structure and functions of the human body, he
held, is to opt for second best at best. As a lifelong advocate of
breast-feeding, he went the length of holding that no reform would
accomplish more for the future of the nation than the restoration of
breast-feeding. (It might, for example, be argued that the trust in
others implanted in a child from his earliest days is an effective
antidote to the Hobbesian notion of society, which requires a
Leviathan-like state to protect men from one another.) In 1957 he
helped found the La Leche League for the promotion of breastfeeding, and he was a consultant for the remaining 40 years of his
life.
He was fond of pointing out that there seems to be no end to
the nutrition found in mother' s milk, including hormones regulating
the proper growth of the child. Moreover breast-feeding fortifies the
bond between mother and child:
For example, the newborn baby' s focal length is the
distance from his eyes to the mother's face when nursing. The
peripheral vision is blocked out.... The baby, like the horse on the
road, has blinders, so to speak. Nature does this for the baby so
that the baby can concentrate on the mother-its rock of refuge
from whom the newborn learns trust and fidelity, which will serve
him in good stead in future human relations. 19

Ratner goes further, holding that to ignore the structure and
functions of the human body may be inviting disaster.
Any fool should know that the vagina is the organ to
receive the inseminating organ, and therefore is the repository of
the semen. Apart from morals, the physician as biologist should
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recognize that to put the penis in the anus, and deposit semen in
the rectum, is to court medical difficulties.
You must realize that everything nature does is exquisite
in terms of subtleties, complexities. Semen, which for the most
part has held the interest of gynecologists only with respect to the
sperm and sterility, is 82 percent plasma. We should realize that
the plasma given by nature has multiple functions. I'll mention
only one.
The sperm and the embryo are foreign bodies in the
woman, and have to be protected against the woman 's immune
system, which builds up antibodies against the sperm and the
embryo. We ' ve known from clinical experience, and in more
recent years through chemical studies, that when a woman is
pregnant she's more susceptible to lots of diseases because the
semen suppresses in part the immune system of her body.
What is this substance in the semen that suppresses the
immune system?
The plasma of semen has the highest
concentration of prostaglandins in the human body. You must
bear in mind that every secretion is a prescription of nature, and
like a doctor's prescription has reasons for every ingredient.
Beyond that, there ' s an organ. The vagina is constJ:"Ucted
to accommodate this process [of immunosuppression], so that the
immune suppressant is modest and modulated. The vaginal wall is
thicker than the membrane of the anus. The vaginal membrane is
composed of squamous cells, overlapping like shingles on a roof
That manages to produce a mild depressant of the immune
system. You know as a biologist that the anus is essentially an
outlet, and its thinner membrane is very absorbent since the
rectum extracts various things from the waste products. The
vagina is essentially an inlet, and absorbs plasma slowly.

Moral theologians of times past may have been wiser than
they knew when they wrote of the vas indebitum, the "undue vessel."
Dr. Ratner, remarking that the most prevalent way of
contracting AIDS is via the anus, asserted that anal intercourse is not
exclusive to homosexual acts but probably accounts for ten or twenty
percent of heterosexual intercourse in this country, and a higher
percentage abroad.
There are "two major scandals" in what is called AIDS
education, he said: first in not making it abundantly clear that the
prime way of spreading the AIDS virus is anal intercourse, and then,
second, in assuming that all heterosexual intercourse is vaginal.
The Hippocratic physician, Ratner held, counsels his patients
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not only to respect nature but to strengthen it as well:
The Hippocratic order of treatment began with a
regimen. You got a good sleep, ate well, relaxed after work, and
exercised. Then came medicine, and finally surgery. Today the
tendency is to reverse the order: the surgeon, then the doctor,
then the regimen. Just recently I read that if you follow a good
regimen, you can dispense with most drugs for high bloodpressure.

In this context the title gIven a physician IS significant,
according to Ratner:
Doctor means teacher. The doctor should educate his
patients in conservative ways to maintain health . This is where
regimen is the best prescription: rest, eat properly, and exercise.

But fidelity to the name of doctor is not, in Ratner's view,
characteristic of medicine today:
This is an age of iatrogenic medicine, of diseases caused
by medical treatment. It's one of the worst periods in history for
medicine. A new book by a heart specialist, [Dryden} Morse,
holds that medications for heart disease are responsible for
50,000 deaths yearly in this country.

Dr. Ratner's concern about the technological imperative can
be seen in the Ratnerian paradox: "Every advance is a setback. ... "
Pause.
Then, mischievously, " ... unless you're a Hippocratic
physician. "
Ratner himself was a protagonist in what is probably the
foremost example of a medical advance that proved a setback, the
introduction of the Salk Vaccine against poliomyelitis. Dr. Eugene
Diamond writes:
On April 12, 1955, there was a nationwide telecast of the
results of the 1954 field trials of the Salk Vaccine. It was called
"The Medical Story of the Century" and, in tenns of the huge
promotion and publicity given to the announcement, that
description of the event was not hyperbole.
Herbert Ratner was, at the time, Director of Public
Health in Oak Park, Illinois, and the Editor of the Bulletin of the
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American Association of Public Health Physicians. His
questioning of the methodology and the soundness of the science
which produced the data is one of the great stories of clinical
integrity of the last 50 years.
His position, taken in the face of overwhelming
opposition, was soon vindicated by the occurrence of vaccineinduced cases of poliomyelitis. It is a dramatic untold story which
is not yet fully played out as scientists continue to question the
long-term significance of the contamination of the Salk Vaccine
with Simian Virus 40. 20

Medicine became a profession, Ratner never tired of recalling,
precisely because its members professed an oath. Moreover medicine
was the first calling to require an oath of its members, and hence was
the first profession. The other professions that followed-the learned
professions of law and divinity, and the military-all became
professions because they too took oaths. Not surprisingly, these oaths
are modeled on the Hippocratic Oath of the physician.
Any professional oath, Ratner maintained, is a bulwark
against "the vagaries of society." That is why, when such "vagaries"
infect a profession, the tendency is to "update" the oath or dismiss it
as a quaint relic of a less enlightened age.
Nor was Ratner at a loss for historical examples. In 1972, he
published a formal protest made by Dutch physicians during the Nazi
occupation of the Netherlands against a supervising body that the
German authorities were about to impose on the Dutch medical
profession. It read in part:
We know that you represent a very special philosophy of
life. Our knowledge of the German "physicians' ordinance"
concerning the task of the physician in which the care for race and
nation takes precedence over that of the individual, makes it only
too clear to what extend the national-socialistic [nazi] conception
of the medical profession differs from ours.
Although we do not deny that the care of the community
and the participation in social hygiene measures constitute part of
the task of the physician, we can recognize this duty only insofar
as it proceeds from and is not in conflict with the first and holiest
precept of the physician, namely the respect for life and for the
physical well-being of the individual who entrusts himself to his
care ....
Knowing ourselves bound by the oath or solemn vow of
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acceptance of our task as physicians, we consider it our duty to
inform you that we shaH remain faithful to the high standards
which have been the foundation of our profession since time
immemorial... .21

Dr. Ratner observed:
This protest underscores the raison d'etre of the
Hippocratic Oath ... and the timelessness of that inspired
document, which today is undergoing attack from brave new
crops of medical students, professors of obstetrics turned
sociologists, social ethicist reformers, population engineers, less
than thoughtful segments of the women's liberation movement,
crusading lawyer-simplifiers of criminal codes, and abortionists
and 'mercy' killers ...
As sensitivities atrophy, and the concept of natural
holiness weakens, as the scorn of God and religion intensifies, we
should once again ask ourselves, "Who are the victors of World
War 1I?,,22

Naturally the question arises whether medicine even remains a
profession when the oath becomes little more than a memory, either
through institutionalized disregard of its provisions or by dispensing
with it altogether. Equivalent to this latter course is the substitution of
other "declarations" at the graduation ceremonies of medical schools.
A "declaration" is not an oath, nor is a solemn pledge or a
promise. In none of these does the promisor, the pledger, or the
declarer swear by some higher power, such as the gods of Greece or
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He does not appeal to what he
holds most sacred to witness his resolve to keep his word. Neither
does he, according to the timeless formula, call down upon himself a
blessing if faithful to what he has sworn, and a curse if unfaithful.
Moreover the contents of the various substitutes for the
Hippocratic Oath incorporate dilutions or distortions to one degree or
another. The so-called Declaration of Geneva, adopted in 1948 by the
General Assembly of the World Medical Association in Geneva, was
meant to replace the Hippocratic Oath on entry into the medical
profession. Its grandiloquent phrases-"consecrate my life to the
service of humanity," and "maintain by all the means in my power the
honor and the noble traditions of the medical profession"-are but
vague substitutes for the hard specifics of the Hippocratic Oath. They
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can scarcely erect the same moral defenses around the medical
profession. Nor has the Geneva Declaration stood fast against
agitation to relax its moral demands.
Dr. Ratner recalled that although the Declaration of Geneva
was designed to reinvigorate the medical profession after the
disclosures of the Nuremberg trials, pro-abortion and pro-euthanasia
forces were already active during its drafting.
I remember reading in the foreign correspondence of the
AMA that originally there was no reference to killing. They were
going to get rid of the prohibition. It was the Latin American
countries that complained.

As published in 1948, the Geneva Declaration stipulates: "I
will maintain the utmost respect for human life, from the time of
conception, even under threat." This adds the ethical element of
resistance to threat, and the scientific understanding that human life
begins at conception, to the Hippocratic requirement that the
physician swear: "I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked,
nor suggest any such counsel; and in like manner 1 will not give a
woman a pessary to produce an abortion." On the other hand the
Oath, as can be seen, is more specific in excluding complicity in
abortion and suicide.
But agitators have been at work since 1948. Subsequent
versions of the Geneva Declaration reveal that, as an artifact of the
times rather than a monument of antiquity, it has not been proof
against ideology. It has been amended in 1968, 1983, and 1994. The
latest version would be labeled in the vocabulary of our times as
politically correct. It incorporates the ideologically-battered science
promoted by advocates of abortion: instead of pledging to "maintain
the utmost respect for human life from the time of conception," it
now refers to "human life from its beginning" (whenever or whatever
that may be, or may prove to be with the next shift in ideology).
Moreover "gender" and "sexual orientation" (meaning sexual
disorientation) have worked their way among the considerations that
the physician may not allow "to intervene between my duty and my
patient."
The vicissitudes of the Geneva Declaration since its approval
half a century ago support the wisdom of leaving well enough alone.
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Little wonder that the gods of Greece remained at the head of the
Hippocratic Oath throughout the most Christian ages.
A modified oath, taken in recent years by medical students at
graduation (if indeed any oath is taken), appears to subsume the
Hippocratic Oath's prohibition of euthanasia and abortion under an
undertaking to "perform no operation, for a criminal purpose, even if
solicited, far less suggest it.,,23 This of course leaves the purely
healing and health-preserving character of the medical profession at
the mercy of civil law, for if abortion or euthanasia is legal, then the
physician can plead that he is bound by no oath against it. Civil
authorities can make the same argument should they demand that
physicians commit legally-sanctioned crimes forbidden by the
Hippocratic Oath but not by a modified oath.
Even weaker in this regard are the American Medical
Association's "Principles of Medical Ethics," which merely demand
that a physician "respect the law" and "the rights of patients, of
colleagues, and of other health professionals." The AMA's
"Principles of Medical Ethics" make another bow to whatever the
civil law may stipulate, possibly at the expense of medical ethics or
even of natural justice, in requiring that the physician "safeguard
patient confidences within the constraints of the law." The Oath on
the other hand burdens the physician with a fully moral obligation to
keep secret "whatever in connection with my professional practice or
not in connection with it" that "ought not to be spoken abroad." Civil
law, far from getting pride of place, does not even enter in.
Where the Geneva Declaration has the physician undertake to
"practice my profession with conscience and dignity," the
Hippocratic Oath has him swear not only to practice his art "with
purity and holiness" but also to pass his life in that same purity and
that same holiness. The Oath seems more realistic in the sense that
one can hardly be a pillar of ethics in the clinic and a moral mess at
home. Moreover purity and holiness of life are hardly compatible
with the abortion that the American Medical Association has not only
tolerated, not only promoted, but even attempted to force upon
medical schools and their students.
A somewhat mysterious document called the Prayer---or
sometimes the Oath- of Maimonides is if anything even more
elevated spiritually than the Hippocratic Oath.24 But it is in no wayan
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oath, for it does not call upon God to witness the truth of a pledge.
Rather it begs Him for light and for strength of body and soul, hence
must be considered a prayer. About twice the length of the
Hippocratic Oath, it can be described as a detailed petition for the
virtues required of a physician.
Two such virtues receive explicit recognition in the
Hippocratic Oath: absolute discretion about private matters learned in
the practice of the profession, and sexual purity. In the Oath the
physician swears to shun "the seduction of females or males,"
whether free or slave. Whereas one modem version of the Oath
tendered new physicians demands that they abstain "from the
tempting of others to vice," the AMA Principles of Medical Ethics
breathe not a word about sexual misbehavior, which as Ratner often
pointed out is an occupational hazard for physicians.
Given the role of the Hippocratic Oath in maintaining the
character of medicine as a healing profession, not a killing profession,
it's no surprise that the U.S. Supreme Court, in attempting to justify
medically-induced abortion, attacked the Oath. It was not a frontal
assault; the opinion fairly glowed with veneration for Hippocrates,
but it attempted to cut the historical ground out from under the Oath.
The Court did this by citing an historian of medicine, Ludwig
Edelstein, who argued that the Oath incorporated the ethical precepts
of a particular philosophical school, the Pythagoreans, and moreover
at a particular time, the fourth century B.C. Said the Court:
Dr. Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in
a group representing only a small segment of Greek opinion and
that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient physicians .... But
with the end of antiquity a decided change took place. Resistance
against suicide and against abortion became common. The Oath
came to be popular. The emerging teachings of Christianity were
in agreement with the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath "became the
nucleus of all medical ethics" and "was applauded as the
embodiment of truth." Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is "a
Pythagorean manifesto and not the expression of an absolute
standard of medical conduct."
This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable
explanation of the Hippocratic Oath' s apparent rigidity.25

In this way, the abortionist Court was able to wave aside two
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millennia of medical tradition and, thus unimpeded, launch its assault
on the medical profession.
For irony, it would be hard to beat the case of Ludwig
Edelstein. He had the foresight to flee Nazi Germany, yet it is an
essay of his that has given scholarly color to the campaign against the
very tradition that surely, had it been maintained, would have saved
many of his fellow Jews. The reason seems to be that he was
unaware, like the rest of the world, of the depth of evil then holding
sway in Germany. He published his study in 1943, before the depth of
the betrayal of German medicine had been made clear.
Moreover, according to the editors of the posthumous
collection of Dr. Edelstein' s studies on ancient medicine in which the
essay was eventually republished, until his death he remained
undecided about it. If that last sentence is not clear, neither were the
editors, Owsei and C. Lilian Temkin, in explaining Edelstein's state
of mind. Their carefully worded introduction leaves the reader in
doubt about the focus of Edelstein's indecision: was it where to
include the essay on the Oath in the book, or whether to include it?
They write:
The present volume contains those essays available after
his death which Edelstein himself had considered for inclusion. It
presents them in the four sections under which he had subsumed
them .26

They add in a footnote: "With the exception of The
Hippocratic Oath, on which he had not reached a decision."
In either case-that is, where or whether Edelstein wanted the
essay republished-the inclusion of "The Hippocratic Oath" in
Ancient Medicine was to lift this momentous essay from the obscurity
of a supplement to the Bulletin of the History of Medicine. With or
without his approval, Edelstein's "The Hippocratic Oath" went before
a broader public in 1967, two years after he died. The editors gave it
pride of place: It is the opening essay of the book.
On the more likely reading that Edelstein never authorized the
republication of his study, we can wonder why he hesitated. We can
even wonder whether he did not eventually determine to withhold the
work. Why might he do either? Would it be dissatisfaction with the
scholarship or argumentation of his essay? Or dread of what uses it
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might be put to?27
In the event, the republished essay not only was cited by the
Supreme Court in striking down virtually all laws prohibiting or
regulating abortion but was earlier exploited by Laurence Lader in his
successful agitation for legal abortion in this country, and was
appealed to in France during the equally successful campaign to
legalize abortion there.
It is certain that Edelstein would have been appalled by the
distortion of his study into a weapon in the worldwide campaign for
abortion. He venerated the Oath. We find him in 1956 declaring
himself "second to none in my appreciation of this document.,,28
Clearly he recognized that whatever the provenance or original
purpose or date of the document-the three points he attempted to
establish in his study- none of these, whatever they might be, could
detract from the decisive role the Hippocratic Oath has played in
forging the character of Western medicine, hence of Western
civilization. Nor could they, whatever they might be, dilute, devalue,
or destroy the ethical principles of the Oath, which became, in
Edelstein's words, "the nucleus of all medical ethics. ,,29 He writes:
In all countries, in all epochs in which monotheism, in its
purely religious or in its more secularized fonn, was the accepted
creed, the Hippocratic Oath was applauded as the embodiment of
truth. Not only Jews and Christians, but the Arabs ... , scientists of
the Enlightenment, and scholars of the nineteenth century
embraced the ideals of the Oath. 3o

This is not the place to examine Dr. Edelstein's celebrated
study in any detail, but a few more observations may help keep it in
perspective.
Edelstein himself, deservedly or not, early had a not altogether
enviable reputation for "constant deviation from accepted views" and
for presenting his arguments "as cogent demonstrations with
inescapable results. ,,31
On a more substantive matter, he betrays a basic if only too
common misunderstanding of the nature of medicine, or at least an
understanding alien to Hippocrates. He repeatedly characterizes
medicine as "a craft," the physician as "a craftsman.,,32 This is no
translator's error: not only did Edelstein scrutinize and emend all
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English translations of his work, but he actually delved into
Aristotle's treatment of crafts as indicative of the esteem for medicine
in Aristotle's time, and held that the Pythagorean and Stoic, and the
later Hellenistic philosophies, confirmed such esteem by upholding
the dignity ofthe craftsman's work. 33
Now a significant characteristic of the Hippocratic Oath is to
call medicine "the Art." This term is used for medicine throughout
the writings of the Hippocratic school, including the Oath itself. To
call medicine an art may not seem very helpful since the word has a
multiplicity of meanings; unless the meaning of art is historically and
contextually clarified, to speak of medicine as an art can and usually
does cause confusion.
An etymological approach to the concept of medicine-as-art
can only confuse us. First, art is the root of artisan, and it was
Edelstein' s apparent error to call the physician a craftsman, that is an
artisan. Moreover the Greek word for art, techne, gave us our word
technology. Yet every Hippocratic physician is aware that if his
profession becomes mere technology, he might as well hand it over to
diagnostic devices and computers. 34
Moderns who seek the significance of medicine-as-art must
look less to linguistics than to Greek philosophy. In the mind of
Aristotle, art and science are, both of them, kinds of knowledge: an
art is knowledge for the sake of producing something, while a science
is knowledge for its own sake. Science finds its fulfilment in
knowledge gained, art in a product produced.
Ratner explains the distinction in terms characteristically
homely, clear, and memorable:
Man is a wondering animal. Unlike other animals he
cannot live in the world without wanting to explain it. Man is also
a making animal. Unlike other animals he cannot live in the world
without wanting to improve it. As a wondering animal he seeks
the reason behind the fact. His goal is truth . As a making animal
he seeks the means to accomplish the end; his goal is the good.
Both activities are functions of his intellect.
Traditionally, these different operations of the mind are
distinguished as the work of the theoretical or speCUlative intellect
and the work of the practical activity. The former activity, when
perfected, characterizes man as a scientist; the latter, as an artist. 35

November, 1998

27

In the case of medicine, the artist finds his fulfillment in
producing health, that is in sustaining it or restoring it. In the case of
law, the fulfillment is to produce justice, that is, to uphold or restore
it. Neither justice nor health, however, can be called an artifact,
which is what is produced by the artisan, the craftsman working on
inert matter.
If art is simply the right way of making something, and if a
single word (techne) was used by the Greeks both for a craft and for a
fine art, how then explain the transcendental leap from the homely art
of the artisan to the ineffable art of a Mozart, a Michelangelo, a
Shakespeare? This obviously is a significant question in the attempt
to understand what the Hippocratic tradition means in calling
medicine "the Art."
To untangle this question we might first clarify how artists in
the more rudimentary sense of those who produce something can
differ among themselves. Here Aristotle, significantly at the outset of
his twelve books of metaphysics, provides us with a hierarchy of
distinctions:
...the man of experience (ernpeiros ) appears wiser than those who
just have some power of sensation or other, the artist (technites)
than men of experience, the master builder (architekton) than the
handicraftsman (cheirotechnes), and the theoretical sciences
(theoretikai ... episternai) than the productive (poietika) .36

Aristotle had already met the objection that a man of
experience may prove more capable of effective action than the
theoretician. There, not surprisingly, he used medicine as his
example. He begins:
.. .we see men of experience succeeding more than those who have
theory without experience. The reason for this is that experience
is knowledge of particulars, but art of universals; and actions and
37
the effects produced are all concerned with the particular.

Aristotle then offers his well-known aphorism:
For it is not man that the physician cures, except incidentally, but
Callias or Socrates or some other like-named person, who is
incidentally a man as well. So if a man has theory without
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experience, and knows the universal but does not know the
particular contained in it, he will often fail in his treatment, for it
is the particular that must be treated.38

Where does this leave the artist who has a grasp of principles?
Aristotle observes:
Nevertheless we consider that knowledge and proficiency belong
to art rather than to experience, and we assume that artists are
wiser than men of mere experience ...; and this is because the
former know the cause, whereas the latter do not. For men of
experience know the fact, but not the wherefore; but artists know
the wherefore and the cause.39

With such common objections overcome, Aristotle can then
claim, as he did in the passage quoted previously, not just the
superiority of experience over animal instinct or sensation, but the
superiority of theoretical knowledge over experience.
In that same passage he moves on to two distinct kinds of
worker, the master-builder (architekton) and the artisan, whose Greek
name cheirotechnes means literally "hand-artist" and might be
rendered "handicraftsman." He has mentioned them earlier, and has
already supported his next claim, that the master-builder is wiser than
the handicraftsman, on grounds that master-builders "know the
reasons for the things that are done, but we think that the
handicraftsmen, like inanimate objects, do things but without
knowing what they are doing ... , through habit.,,4o
If a knowledge of the reasons for doing things sets the masterbuilder apart from the handicraftsman, is that same knowledge what
sets the sculptor apart from his stonecarvers, or the physician apart
from the aides and technicians he may employ? In part, yes, for
physician and sculptor alike understand causes that their technically
skilled helpers, however intelligent and productive, may not. But the
specific difference between the true artist and the artisan, as indeed
between the true artist and the master-builder, has to be sought
elsewhere. It is found in the material, so to speak, that the true artist
works on: human nature itself.
Thus the clearest exemplar of the true artist is the physician.
He works on the human being, in cooperation with that purposeful
inner activity--or entelechy, to use the Aristotelian term in its more
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modern, vitalistic sense-which is proper to all living things.
St. Thomas, distinguishing between arts that work upon inert
matter, such as wood and stone for the art of building, and arts that
work upon "an active principle tending to produce the effect of the
art," takes medicine for his example of the latter:
Such is the medical art, since in the sick body there is an active
principle conducive to health. Hence the effect of art of the first
kind [working on inert matter] is never produced by nature but is
always the result of the art; every house is an artifact. But the
effect of the art of the second kind is the result both of art and of
nature without art; for many are cured by the action of nature
without the art of medicine.
Now in those things which can be done both by art and
by nature, art imitates nature. 4 1

To fill out the picture a word must be said about other arts
such as that of the jurist and those of the composer, poet, painter and
sculptor. The last two are manifestly imitative of nature. Since
Aristotle's Poetics at least, the notion of art as the imitation of nature
has held pride of place, but it has been applied chiefly if not
exclusively to the esthetic arts. 42 The Poetics, a fragmentary work of
which we possess perhaps half, has aided and abetted this narrow
view by dealing less with the analysis of principles than with their
application to poetry and music, and to the artistic conventions of the
author' s day. Yet implicit throughout the book, and explicit often
enough, is the principle that the artist of every kind, through what he
produces in imitation of human life, aims at affecting human nature.
By their nature, the esthetic arts first affect the emotions, but
the classic view, embodied in the civic theater and civic architecture
of Athens, and in the cathedrals and morality plays of the Middle
Ages, has been that such arts answer their finest calling when they
bring the right emotions to the aid of principle, thus creating
conviction. Or perhaps when the physician uses them as part of his
therapeutic regimen.
We can see that what constitutes the specific difference
between an art in the more inclusive and homely sense and an art in
the more exclusive and higher sense is twofold: the artist' s
knowledge of the beauty that affects our emotions, and his ability to
bring that beauty into being. When a beautifully designed building is
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directed at our senses, and through them elevates our spirit much as
does music or poetry, architecture moves beyond the task of an
artisan or even a master-builder to the achievement of an artist. In
other words, the transcendental (or "quantum") leap to pure art is
made when the worker knowingly brings his skills to bear on human
nature, stimulating and harnessing, so to speak, its powers.
Here we can discern that the concept of art is as important for
a right understanding of law as it is of medicine. In the art of the jurist
the mind puts our natural thirst for justice, and our rational grasp of
the intrinsically right thing, to work in the affairs of men to set them
right, thus safeguarding or restoring the health of society.
Jurisprudence works with nature in what can be considered its highest
activity, namely the production of virtue.
This stands athwart the currently dominant philosophy of law,
called Legal Positivism (or sometimes Historicism, a quite similar
thing), which conceives law as an artifact produced by and out of the
arbitrary will of the lawmaker, or as another variant would have it, of
the judge. The Roman jurists, on the contrary, spoke of law as turning
the establishment of the intrinsically right thing into an art-jus
redigere in artem-much as we can say Hippocratic medicine turns
the preservation and restoration of health into an art.
This classic notion of art, needless to say, has just about
evaporated from the minds of us modems. Nor is our understanding
of the tradition that law and medicine are arts given much help when
we learn that the liberal arts, the study of which is according to
Ratner the best preparation for the study of medicine, are really
sciences. They are called arts by analogy.
Sometimes the analogy is construed as illustrating that the
liberal arts produce educated men, or knowledge that can be
considered useful. St. Thomas proposes a closer parallel : The seven
liberal arts of grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music,
and astronomy are called arts because "they not only have knowledge
but a certain product." Grammar is said to produce a properly
constructed sentence, logic correct reasoning, rhetoric a speech, and
so forth. 43
In any case, what we get is a mish-mash: medicine, nowadays
called a science, is in the classical tradition an art, while the liberal
arts, traditionally the best preparation for medical studies, are
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sciences in the classical sense.
An essay called simply "The Art" ("Peri Technes") is one of
the better-known writings in the Hippocratic corpus. For the
Hippocratic physician, medicine is the art par excellence. Yet so
finnly locked in the modern psyche is a notion of art as a knack
perfected by practice, or as a preternatural gift given a Mozart or a
Michelangelo, that translators of the essay-not a work of
Hippocrates, by the way- actually changed title and text alike to
confonn with the notion that medicine is, in their term, "an exact
science." Moreover they twist and turn to avoid the wordplay that
opens the essay: "Some there are who have made an art of vilifying
the arts .. .. " The translators wrestle this into banality: "There are men
who have made a business of abusing the sciences. ,,44
Misreadings of the nature of medicine are practically the rule.
In the past two centuries and more, since the "scientific" side of
medicine revealed its wonders and began its triumphal march,
medicine has been progressively abandoning its Hippocratic selfunderstanding. That means, chiefly, retreat from nature in its
manifold functions: first, as the prime healer, to be aided by the art of
the physician; then as the standard of nonnality, to be aimed at by the
physician in his art; and last though by no means least as the standard
of ethics, to be defended by him as if the very life of medicine
depended on it. And so it does, for if medicine is no longer a moral
art, it is no longer a living profession.
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